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HOW MIGHT THE SUPREME COURT, IF IT 
REVIEWS THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION’S 2015 
OPEN INTERNET ORDER, UTILIZE THE 
CHEVRON AND THE ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS TESTS? 
 
John B. Meisel* 
PART I. INTRODUCTION. 
The Supreme Court, in the 1984 case Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,1 outlined a general framework regarding judi-
cial deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
statutory provision that the agency administers.2 In 2005, in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services,3 the Court held 
that the Chevron framework continues to apply when an administrative agency 
changes a prior interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers.4 
However, an unexplained change in statutory interpretation can be a reason for 
concluding that the new interpretation fails to pass the arbitrary and capricious 
test enacted by Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).5 The 
Court recognized that a change in policy is not necessarily invalidating because 
the judicially created Chevron doctrine values agency flexibility to respond to 
                                                             
 * Emeritus Professor of Economics; Southern Illinois University Edwardsville. 
 1 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2 Id. at 842-45. 
 3 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 4 Id. at 983. 
 5 Administrative Procedure Act §109(2)(e)(B)(1), 5 U.S.C § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
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changing circumstances.6 Thus, in light of these two key administrative law 
cases, when a court reviews the legality of a change in statutory interpretation 
by an administrative agency, it conducts both the Chevron test for the new 
statutory interpretation and the arbitrary and capricious test for the resulting 
change in policy. 
In 2002, the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter the Agency) 
classified broadband service as an information service.7 In justifying the classi-
fication, the Agency argued that the statutory term “offer” in the definition of 
telecommunications services8 was ambiguous. Moreover, the Agency present-
ed facts and reasons why broadband service should not be regulated under Ti-
tle II of the Communications Act as a telecommunications service, but under 
Title I as a lightly regulated information service.9 In 2005, the Brand X deci-
sion utilized the Chevron framework to review the Agency’s decision, held 
that the statute was ambiguous, and found the Agency’s information service 
classification decision lawful.10 Still, the Agency believed that regardless of the 
classification decision, it retained statutory authority, under Title I, to intervene 
in the broadband market if it felt that some regulations may be necessary to 
further the public interest.11 
It was not until the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia’s decision in 2014, in Verizon v. FCC,12 that the Agency found the statutory 
authority to impose regulations on broadband service providers, specifically to 
                                                             
 6 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
521 (1985) (“Changes in the underlying social and economic circumstances on which the 
rules were originally premised, the discovery of new empirical data, the reanalysis of old 
data, and even the reconsideration of an agency’s mandate within a zone of discretion per-
mitted by Congress were all held to provide acceptable grounds for an agency’s regulatory 
reversal.”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 518 (1989) (“…the capacity of the Chevron approach to accept chang-
es in agency interpretation ungrudgingly seems to me one of the strongest indications that 
the Chevron approach is correct.”); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 206 (“For banking, telecom-
munications, national security, and environmental protection—-among many other areas—-
changing circumstances often require agencies to adapt old provisions to unanticipated 
problems.”). 
 7 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other 
Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4831 ¶56 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Cable Order]. 
 8 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2012). 
 9 2002 Cable Order, supra note 7, at 4802 ¶5. 
 10 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet, 545 U.S. 967, 972 (2005). 
 11 Id. at 980-81. 
 12 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reviewing Agency action in 
Report and Order, Preserving the Open Internet); In re Preserving the Open Internet, GN 
Docket No. 09-191, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17907 (2010). 
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achieve the statutory goal of improving broadband infrastructure and deploy-
ment.13 However, in judicial review of the Agency’s rulemaking action, the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that two of the regulations the Agency had proposed 
(the anti-blocking and the anti-discrimination rules) treated broadband service 
providers as common carriers, which was inconsistent with the Agency’s prior 
2002 classification of the service as an information service.14 In response, 
drawing on this newly sanctioned statutory authority15 and responding to the 
problems with its 2010 order, the Agency conducted a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking proceeding that culminated in its decision in 2015 to reclassify 
broadband service as a telecommunications service.16 The reclassification deci-
sion meant that providers of the reclassified service were considered to be 
common carriers and, thus, became subject to Title II regulation.17 In 2016, in 
United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission, 
the D.C. Circuit upheld the reclassification decision (by a vote of 2 to 1)18 
which has generated intense criticisms by academics, the dissent in the reclas-
sification decision, and broadband industry participants.19 It is likely that the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in 2016 will be appealed to the Court.20 The purpose of 
this article is to analyze arguments concerning whether the Agency’s Open 
Internet Order is likely to (1) be subject to the Chevron test for the reclassifica-
tion decision in light of a 2015 Court decision King v. Burwell and (2) pass the 
arbitrary and capricious test21 for the change in its policy in light of a 2009 
Court decision. 
                                                             
 13 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628. 
 14 Id. at 650. 
 15 Telecommunications Act of 1996 §706(b), 47 U.S.C. §1302(b) (2012). 
 16 In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, Report and 
Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 5601, 5619 ¶ 394(2015) 
[hereinafter Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet]. 
 17 Id. at 5615 ¶ 43 (relaxing many Title II regulations with use of its statutory forbear-
ance authority in conjunction with the reclassification of broadband Internet service). 
 18 United States Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 19 Justin Hurwitz, Regulating the Most Powerful Network Ever, Vol. 10, No. 9, THE 
FREE ST. FOUND. 7 (2015), 
tp://freestatefoundation.org/images/Regulating_the_Most_Powerful_Network_Ever_021815
.pdf (anticipating the release of the Open Internet Order, Professor Hurwitz powerfully cri-
tiqued the forthcoming order, anticipating many of the subsequent criticisms of the order); 
Robert W. Crandall, Regulation Won’t Preserve a Dynamic and “Open Internet”, Vol. 10, 
THE FREE ST. FOUND. 1 (2015) (surrounding the granting of Chevron deference to the Agen-
cy’s reclassification decision, several of the author’s criticisms are addressed in Part II). 
 20 Cecilia King, Court Backs Rules Treating Internet as Utility, Not Luxury, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 2016, at B1. 
 21 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (requiring that a court will “set aside agency action” 
which is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”). 
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Part II first provides a brief summary of the Chevron framework and its ma-
jor questions exception. It then analyzes the possibility that, in light of the 
2015 Court decision, the Court could bypass the Chevron test and provide its 
own de novo interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision.  Part III first 
summarizes the lessons of the 2009 Court decision that provided a new stand-
ard for analyzing an agency’s change in policy. Then, these lessons are applied 
to evaluate the controversy surrounding the D.C. Circuit’s review in US Tele-
comm and the justification offered for the Agency’s change in policy resulting 
from its reclassification of broadband service. Part IV offers a short conclu-
sion. 
PART II. CHEVRON TEST. 
The 1984 Chevron decision identified the following process for judicial re-
view of an administrative agency’s statutory interpretation: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it 
is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that 
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Con-
gress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simp-
ly impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of 
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.22 
Initially, the Chevron framework was described as comprised of two steps. 
Chevron step one is the sole responsibility of the reviewing court using the 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation23 to ascertain whether the statute has 
a clear meaning. Three possible answers to the question are possible: (1) the 
court determines that the statute unambiguously means what the agency inter-
preted the statute to mean, (2) the statute unambiguously does not mean what 
the agency interpreted it to mean, or (3) the statute is ambiguous or silent with 
respect to the precise question at issue.24 Answers (1) and (2) indicate that the 
                                                             
 22 Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 838, 842-43 (1984). 
 23 DANIEL SHEDD & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43203, CHEVRON DEFER-
ENCE: COURT TREATMENT OF AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF AMBIGUOUS STATUTES 5-6 
(2013) (regarding exactly what tools are acceptable in Chevron step one for the purposes of 
statutory interpretation is subject to a wide variety of answers. Statutory interpretive tools 
such as the plain meaning of the text under examination, the whole of the statutory frame-
work and/or structure, related statutes, legislative history, regulatory history, the agency’s 
prior readings of the text, and the importance of the issue have been used to construe the 
meaning of statutes). 
 24 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
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court can unambiguously make a determination regarding how the agency in-
terpretation matches up to the precise question at issue.25 However, if the court 
determines that answer (3) applies to the question at issue, then the court pro-
ceeds to Chevron step two to determine if the administrative agency’s interpre-
tation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.26 
Chevron step two is the step in the procedure in which the court grants def-
erence to the agency’s statutory interpretation if it determines the interpretation 
to be reasonable.27 A reasonable interpretation is one that falls within a zone of 
acceptable interpretations with the boundaries of the zone determined by the 
court. If the agency’s interpretation falls within that zone, the interpretation 
does not have to be the one that a court would necessarily select. This is the 
part of the process that deviated from prior judicial practice and, thus, repre-
sented the revolutionary aspect of the Chevron decision.28 It represents a trans-
fer of interpretive authority from the judicial branch of government to the ex-
ecutive branch. Why would the judiciary voluntarily transfer interpretive pow-
er to the executive branch? 
The answer to the question contains a legal and a policy component. Most 
importantly and in a legal sense, deference is in order because when a statutory 
provision is determined to be ambiguous, it is the implicit intent of Congress to 
allocate the authority to interpret the ambiguity to the executive branch.29 
Moreover, Congress assigns this interpretive-power allocation decision to ad-
ministrative agencies for two policy reasons: the relative expertness of agency 
personnel and the political accountability of the executive branch compared to 
the judiciary.30 The policy rationales are based on the Chevron assumption that 
statutory ambiguity often results from competing interests contained in the 
statute and the choice for the best way to resolve the competing interests 
should be made by a politically responsive institution with intimate and expert 
knowledge of the industry.31 
                                                             
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 843. 
 27 Id. at 842-843. 
 28 Id. at 844. 
 29 Sunstein, supra note 6. For background on this implicit assumption, one can compare 
the views of two Supreme Court justices who are also eminent administrative law scholars 
(the late Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer). Both justices agreed that Chevron deference is 
only justified when it is the intent of Congress to have the agency make the interpretation. 
However, they disagree about the circumstances when such an implicit intent is likely. Jus-
tice Scalia argued for a broad presumption of delegation in contrast to Justice Breyer who 
developed a checklist of factors influencing the likelihood of congressional delegation of 
interpretive authority that he applied (and still applies) on a case-by-case basis. 
 30 Chevron, 467 U. S. at 865. 
 31 Id. 
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The Chevron decision, interpreted broadly, suggested that as long as the 
statute under consideration was determined by the court to be ambiguous, this 
was a necessary and sufficient condition to grant deference to any reasonable 
statutory interpretation made by an administrative agency.32 However, as the 
Chevron framework evolved, statutory ambiguity by itself was no longer as-
sumed to be a sufficient condition for deference. Specifically, more clarity 
from the courts was needed regarding the circumstances in which an implied 
delegation from Congress to an administrative agency was a reasonable as-
sumption for the court to make.33 One approach to cabin the reach of the Chev-
ron framework identified threshold conditions that must be satisfied before the 
court utilized the two-step framework to review an agency’s statutory interpre-
tation.34 These conditions are examined in what is denoted as Chevron step 
zero.35 
A second class of interpretive cases that raise questions about whether an 
implied delegation from Congress to an agency is intended is referred to as the 
“major questions” exception.36 Until 2015, the Court’s reliance on the “major 
questions” exception occurred within the context of the Chevron two-step 
framework and, thus, was not considered part of the Chevron step zero analy-
sis.37 However, in what could be an important development in administrative 
                                                             
 32 Id. at 866. The Chevron doctrine contains its own internal limitations that retain in-
terpretive power with the judiciary. In Chevron step one, if a court finds the statute to be 
unambiguous, there is no need to proceed to the next step. In Chevron step two, if the court 
finds the agency’s interpretation to be unreasonable (a rather weak constraint), there is no 
deference to the agency. 
 33 City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013). 
 34 Chevron step zero became the third step in the judicial procedure for the review of an 
agency’s statutory interpretation. The Court developed Chevron step zero conditions to 
identify when an implied delegation from Congress to an agency is likely in the following 
case: U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241-43 (2001). The two Mead conditions are (1) 
whether Congress had granted general rulemaking and/or adjudicative power to the agency 
and (2) whether the agency’s statutory interpretation utilized that authority. 
 35 This term was created by two prominent legal scholars in the following article: 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833, 836 
(2001). See also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 191 n. 19 (showing that Professor Sunstein bor-
rowed the term for the title of his article). 
 36 In general, a “major question” is one in which an agency’s statutory interpretation has 
significant economic and political effects and/or is likely to change significantly a regulato-
ry scheme. There is no quantitative scale available to distinguish between a “major ques-
tion” and all other interpretive questions (what might be called “minor questions”). 
 37 For instance, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 121 
(2000), the Court, in examining whether the FDA had statutory authority to extend regula-
tion to tobacco products, relied on the unlikelihood of an implied delegation from Congress 
to the FDA for such an economically and politically significant question as the regulation of 
tobacco products in conjunction with other statutory interpretive tools to find, in its Chevron 
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law doctrine, the Court used the “major questions” exception in King v. Bur-
well38 in the context of its pre-Chevron analysis, i.e., as another Chevron step 
zero requirement. The remaining discussion in Part II of this article examines 
whether the Court might use this novel approach utilized in the King decision, 
instead of relying on the Chevron framework and the Brand X decision as the 
D.C. Circuit did in US Telecomm, to resolve for itself the broadband service 
classification issue in the Open Internet Order.39 Such a move would deny the 
power to the next administration to reverse the Agency’s reclassification deci-
sion, although, of course, the Court could decide to interpret the statute to clas-
sify broadband service as a telecommunications service. 
                                                                                                                                            
step one analysis, that the statute was unambiguous in ruling out the FDA’s interpretation. 
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442-43 (2014), the Court, in 
examining whether the EPA had authority to expand permitting requirements for green-
house gases emissions for non-stationary sources once it had determined that regulation of 
these gases from mobile sources was within its legal authority, expressed great concern 
about the EPA’s interpretation since it would cause large economic effects on the agency 
and the industries it regulated (imposing a permitting requirement on millions of small 
sources) to find, at Chevron step two, that the EPA’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute 
was unreasonable. Both uses of the “major questions” exception impacted the Court’s rea-
soning in concert with its application of the two-step Chevron framework. In these cases, the 
exception helped the Court interpret the statute as the Court had real doubt about whether 
Congress would implicitly delegate such an economically and politically significant ques-
tion to an agency. 
 38 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015). 
 39 In United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2016) the court 
argued that Brand X controlled the court’s review of the reclassification decision and dis-
counted the role of the “major questions” exception (citing the FDA v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2001)) because its use in the tobacco case was in con-
junction with achieving clarity in the Court’s Chevron step one decision. The majority and 
dissent (United States Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016)) accept-
ed the Brand X holding that the definition of a telecommunications service was ambiguous. 
264  THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY  [Vol. 25.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
Application of the King decision to the Open Internet Order.40 
In King, the Court reviewed an IRS interpretation41 of an Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) provision involving eligibility for federal tax credits when a cus-
tomer purchased health insurance on a federal health-care exchange.42 To de-
velop the IRS’s interpretation, the agency had satisfied the Chevron step zero 
Mead threshold conditions since Congress had granted the agency general 
rulemaking power and it had exercised that power in a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking proceeding. Nonetheless, in an unprecedented move, the Court 
invoked the “major questions” exception by casting aside the Chevron frame-
work.43  Specifically, the Court argued: 
“When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-step 
framework announced in Chevron. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute 
is ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. This ap-
proach “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit 
delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In extraordinary 
cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has 
                                                             
 40 See generally Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King 
v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56 (2015); see also Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, 
King v. Burwell: What Does It Portend for Chevron’s Domain? 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72 
(2015); Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. 
J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479 (2016); Major Questions Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191 
(2016); Brief for Respondent, U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, Nos. 15-1063, (D.C. Cir. filed 
July 29, 2016); Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality’s Path to the Supreme Court: Chevron and 
the “Major Questions” Exception, Vol. 11 No. 21 THE FREE ST. FOUND. (2016), 
http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/Net_Neutrality_s_Path_to_the_Supreme_Court_
-_Chevron_and_the_Major_Questions_Exception_062416.pdf; Jody Freeman, The Chevron 
Sidestep, EMMETT ENV’T LAW & POL’Y CLINIC (2016), 
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/the-chevron-sidestep/; Lisa Heinzerling, The 
Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757770; Nathan Richardson, Safety Valve: The Resurgent “Major 
Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV., (forthcoming 2017), 
http://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2016/09/Richardson_Safety-
Valve-RC4_distrib.pdf; Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron’s Retreat, GEORGE 
MASON CSAS REVISITING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE CONF. (May 20, 2016), 
http://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2016/06/Sharkey_In-the-
Wake-of-Chevron_5_20_16.pdf. 
 41 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483 (concluding after de novo review that the provision in ques-
tion was ambiguous); see also Id. at 2496-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that the 
provision was ambiguous). 
 42 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 43 See Heinzerling, supra note 40, manuscript at 18-19 (“The Court, in the Chevron era, 
never before put the Chevron framework entirely to the side in circumstances presented in 
King: an interpretation of a statute deemed ambiguous, arrived at after notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, by the agency charged by the statute with making rules to implement the provi-
sion interpreted.”). 
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intended such an implicit delegation.”  This is one of those cases.”44 
The Court cited the following factors to justify its extraordinary characteri-
zation of the case and that may have application to the Agency’s interpretation 
in the Open Internet Order: (1) a major question of economic and political sig-
nificance, (2) a question that was central to the statutory scheme, and (3) Con-
gress would be expected to have expressly delegated such an important ques-
tion to an agency, if its intent was to give the agency interpretive power over 
the provision.45 
The Open Internet Order arguably satisfies these three factors and, thus, the 
Court could decide to set aside the Chevron framework in its entirety if it fol-
lows the King precedent.46 The Internet is a revolutionary innovation that 
touches many economic and political aspects of our society.47 For instance, the 
public debate generated by the reclassification rulemaking proceeding involved 
over four million comments and intense controversy between political parties.48  
Although there is no objective way to demonstrate the economic and political 
significance of an issue, it is at least arguable that the reclassification decision 
could be so classified. Next, the way the Agency decides to classify broadband 
service is a central aspect of the Agency’s statutory scheme for the Internet. 
With an information service classification, the Agency has little regulatory 
power to intervene and correct what it views as problems caused by such a 
classification. For example, one of the Agency’s on-going concerns is that, 
given a broadband service provider’s position as a gateway to the Internet end 
user, the nature of a customer’s access to edge providers is controlled by the 
customer’s broadband access provider.49 If, instead, broadband service is clas-
                                                             
 44 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). 
 45 King 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (citing Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2444 (2014) (The Court added to factor (3) with its doubt about whether the IRS was the 
appropriate expert agency to address the statutory question even if Congress had made an 
express delegation)). 
 46 It should be noted that there is no question that the Agency has a general grant of 
rulemaking power from Congress and that it exercised that power in developing the reclassi-
fication decision. That is, the interpretation satisfied the Mead threshold conditions. The 
question in this article is whether there still is a lack of implicit delegation for the Agency to 
decide the question of reclassification of broadband service. 
 47 Hurwitz, supra note 19, at 4 (attributed to Tom Wheeler, former chairman of the 
Agency). 
 48 Simone A. Friedlander, Net Neutrality and the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 905, 924 (2016); see also Tom Risen, FCC Enacts Title II Net Neu-
trality Rules With Partisan Vote, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/26/fcc-enacts-title-ii-net-neutrality-rules-
with-partisan-vote. 
 49 The nature of a customer’s broadband access is controlled by the customer’s broad-
band service provider who controls the answer to questions such as whether an end user has 
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sified as a telecommunications service, then the statutory scheme is fundamen-
tally different. The Agency has significant power to control the nature of ac-
cess to end-users.50 In fact, this is the main reason why cable and telephone 
broadband companies are so adamantly opposed to the Open Internet Order 
and are hoping and predicting that the new administration will reverse the re-
classification decision.51 Finally, the Agency relied on statutory ambiguity and, 
thus, an implied delegation to justify its interpretive authority and, clearly, did 
not possess an explicit grant of authority from Congress.52 
If the Court sets aside the Chevron framework, and thus the Brand X prece-
dent relied on by the D.C. Circuit in US Telecomm, when it reviews the Agen-
cy’s reclassification decision, then the Trump administration would be unable 
to reverse the reclassification decision through an Agency reinterpretation giv-
en the stare decisis effect of a judicial determination.53 Interestingly, in King, 
the Court set aside the agency decision even though it ultimately arrived at the 
same interpretation as the agency.54 Some see the King decision as another sig-
nal of increasing judicial unease with the growth of the administrative state and 
the role that the Chevron framework has played in that growth.55 The King de-
                                                                                                                                            
access to all edge providers, whether access to end users can be throttled, or whether edge 
providers can or must pay for priority access, say over rival edge providers, to end users. 
Edge providers, such as Google and Amazon, provide content and applications over the 
Internet to end users. 
 50 Communications Act of 1934, 42 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2012). 
 51 See Brian Fung, Cable and telecom companies just lost a huge court battle on net 
neutrality, WASH. POST (June 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2016/06/14/the-fcc-just-won-a-sweeping-victory-on-net-neutrality-in-federal-
court/?utm_term=.766aa9726c0b (cable and telecommunications companies argue that re-
classification creates new obligations to consumers). 
 52 See Eric Geller, Here’s the FCC’s full legal defense of its net neutrality rules, THE 
DAILY DOT (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/fcc-net-neutrality-legal-
defense/ (explaining how the crux of the FCC’s argument over its net neutrality regulations 
is based on Chevron deference). 
 53 See Brendan Bordelon, Net Neutrality Rollback Under Trump Will Face Hurdles, 
MORNING CONSULT (Dec. 21, 2016), https://morningconsult.com/2016/12/21/net-neutrality-
rollback-trump-will-face-hurdles/ (referring to federal appellate litigation upholding net 
neutrality regulations). But see Russell Brandom, Will net neutrality survive Donald 
Trump?, THE VERGE (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/11/30/13795030/net-
neutrality-donald-trump-fcc-repeal-open-internet (proposing that previous court rulings 
upholding FCC net neutrality regulations do not explicitly prevent its regulatory rollback). 
 54 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015). 
 55 Scholars have expressed this sentiment. See Sharkey, supra note 40, at 1-2 (“Recent 
U.S. Supreme Court opinions, eliding Chevron altogether or declining to defer for one rea-
son or another, have led scholars to proclaim the “terminal” state of the venerable doctrine 
of agency deference in statutory interpretation. Some have linked the Court’s push-back to 
wider hostility toward the ever-approaching administrative state, threatening individual 
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cision also can be viewed as another effort (after an unsuccessful attempt to do 
so in City of Arlington v. FCC) by Chief Justice Roberts to scale back Chevron 
deference. The question whether Congress has delegated authority in an im-
plicit way to an agency to make an interpretive decision (a step zero question) 
seems to be of growing importance to the Court and, if the pattern continues, 
calls for a greater interpretive role by the courts.56 The Open Internet Order 
may be a good test case for the Court to identify in more explicit terms the pa-
rameters of this potentially new role for the “major question” exception that 
scales back use of the Chevron framework.57 
PART III. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW OF AN AGENCY’S 
CHANGE IN POLICY. 
The Fox Standard 
The standard an agency must satisfy to pass the arbitrary and capricious test 
for a change in policy is explained in FCC v. Fox Televisions Stations Inc.58 
The authority a court has to conduct the test is found in the APA and the ma-
jority in Fox explained that the standard must be consistent with the text of the 
statute as understood when it was enacted in 1946.59 The statute is clear that an 
agency change in policy is not subject to a more heightened standard compared 
to the standard for an agency’s initial policy position.60 Following precedent, 
the Court should employ a narrow standard of review and require an agency to 
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its ac-
                                                                                                                                            
liberty and democratic governance. Knocking down Chevron, a pillar of the administrative 
state, deals a blow to over-exuberate regulators and promises to stem the tide of over-
regulation of the economy and health and safety.”). 
 56 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, C., concurring) (adding 
to the increasing concern with whether Congress would implicitly delegate “major ques-
tions” to an agency, there appears to be a growing discussion within the Court with whether 
Congress can delegate legislative authority to an agency). 
 57 Lyons, supra note 40, at 1, 2 (making a similar point). 
 58 FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 503 (2009). 
 59 Id. at 514. 
 60 See Id. at 550-51 (Breyer, S.G. dissenting) (agreeing that the standard was not height-
ened but still maintained that the fact of change is a relevant factor that must be addressed. 
Thus, the agency should be required to provide an explanation for the change in policy. For 
instance, the agency should explain why it has decided to change its policy and the reasons 
that led it to adopt the initial policy. Justice Breyer did seem to leave open the possibility 
that an agency could change a policy just because it weighs the relevant considerations dif-
ferently but was unwillingly to accept that explanation in Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 
514). 
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tion.”61 
In order to provide a reasoned explanation for the new policy, the agency 
must: 
Display an awareness that it is changing policy, 
Show that there are good reasons for the new policy, and 
Believe the new policy to be better than the prior policy.62 
The third element of the explanation for the new policy is clear in that it 
does not require the agency to explain how the new policy is better than the 
prior policy but only that the agency believes that to be the case.  Thus, there is 
no need for a comparative policy analysis.63 This leads to a concern, by some, 
that the change in policy could be largely attributable to undue political influ-
ence.64 This objection can be rebutted in two ways; one, the new policy still 
must be reasonable and be accompanied by good reasons, and two, the political 
system is structured to have political appointees as the leading policymakers in 
administrative agencies, inevitably inviting political concerns into the agency 
decision-making process. In sum, the first lesson from Fox instructs that com-
parative judgments among reasonable policy choices are not necessary in an 
agency’s explanation for a change in policy. 
The second lesson of Fox addresses the question of what constitutes a good 
reason for a new policy. It should be noted that these two lessons capture dif-
ferent dimensions of the new Fox standard that can be usefully distinguished 
by means of a conceptual framework. The framework distinguishes between 
two dimensions of the arbitrary and capricious test, the breadth and depth of 
the analysis. The new Fox standard limited the breadth dimension (the scope of 
relevant elements that are examined) and reduced the depth dimension (the 
degree of intensity of the analysis for a relevant element) for judicial review of 
an agency’s change in policy.65 The breadth dimension of the arbitrary and ca-
                                                             
 61 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n Inc. of U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Automotive 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 62 Fox TV Stations, 556 U.S. at 515-16. 
 63 See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1355, 1388-93 (2016). 
 64 For an example of this concern, see Richard Murphy, Politics and Policy Change in 
American Administrative Law, 28 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 325, 341 
(2010) (“In short, it is perfectly reasonable for courts, when exercising the discretionary 
judgment needed to apply arbitrariness review, to eye agency policy changes with more 
suspicion where there are grounds for thinking that the agency’s judgment was distorted by 
strong political preferences.”). 
 65 See, Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 UNIV. OF 
MIAMI L. REV. 555, 574 (2011) (distinguishing between the “breadth” and “depth” dimen-
sions of the scope of judicial review as this terminology will be used in the discussion in this 
article). 
2017] The 2015 Open Internet Order& Chevron 269 
pricious test refers to “what aspects of an administrative decision must be 
weighed for their persuasiveness or reasonableness.”66 Aspects of the breadth 
dimension include elements such as the requirement that an agency demon-
strate that it developed a complete factual record, responded to objections to 
the policy selected, considered viable alternatives to the policy selected, indi-
cated how the relevant factors identified in the statute are accommodated, and 
explained how the policy selected is consistent with statutory goals.67  The fail-
ure by an agency to address a breadth dimension in the justification for its ac-
tion can lead a court to find the action arbitrary and capricious. The Fox stand-
ard excluded the element (over the objections of the minority) that an agency, 
when changing a policy, explain why the reasons for the original policy are no 
longer valid or explain how the new policy achieves the statutory goals better 
than the previous policy.68 In short, comparative policy evaluation is not a nec-
essary aspect of the breadth dimension when an agency justifies a change in 
policy.69 As a result of the contraction of the breadth dimension, the Fox stand-
ard should make it easier for an agency to change a policy.70 
The depth dimension deals with “the question of how reasonable these re-
spective determinations must be.”71 In other words, for each relevant factor of 
the breath dimension of the administrative action, what is the magnitude of the 
detail and the intensity of the depth analysis expected to meet the reasonable-
ness standard?72 In Fox, the majority and the dissent disagreed about how ex-
acting judicial review should be with respect to the depth dimension of the ad-
ministrative action. The majority seemed intent to return to the original mean-
ing of the APA which is to engage in a highly deferential approach when a 
court reviews an agency’s policy decision.73 The dissent advocated closer scru-
                                                             
 66 Id. 
 67 See Garland, supra note 6; See id. at 535-61 (explaining an extensive discussion of 
various aspects that comprise substantive review by courts of an agency decision-making 
process to arrive at its policy action). 
 68 Levin, supra note 65. 
 69 Id. One could describe the placing of limits on the breadth dimension as “narrowing” 
the scope of review. 
 70 Id. (“The basic argument of the essay is that Fox will at least slightly broaden the 
capacity of an administration to pursue an agenda of change and that this development is, on 
the whole, salutary.”). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. Professor Hurwitz provides an excellent example of how the expectations for what 
is considered to be a reasonable explanation of a policy differ between the majority and the 
dissent in the Open Internet Order. The differences over how intense judicial review should 
be are addressed in the application section of Part III. Gus Hurwitz, DC Circuit Court of 
Appeals: So deferential it’s “asleep at the switch”, TECHPOLICYDAILY (June 20, 2016), 
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/dc-circuit-appeals-asleep-switch/. 
 73 Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. 
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tiny of the agency’s reasoning process, more reflective of the expectations of 
an agency acting as a judicial body.74  The majority only required that the 
agency’s reasons for the policy change were “rational” and did not require the 
agency to use additional procedures or gather additional data, staples of the 
demands of a court that utilizes a hard look approach.75  Some scholars see this 
relaxed approach to what is acceptable as a good reason to be too deferential.76  
Regardless, the second lesson of Fox instructs that the requirements of what 
constitutes a good reason should reflect a highly deferential approach, appro-
priate for an agency acting as a policymaker, not as a judicial body, as revealed 
in the text of the governing statute, the APA.77 
A third lesson of Fox identifies two special cases in which both the majority 
and dissent agree that an agency’s change in policy must provide a more de-
tailed explanation than that expected for an initial policy decision; “when, for 
                                                                                                                                            
REV. 419, 424-25 (2009) (“Consequently, after Fox Television, courts should replace State 
Farm’s dicta and the hard look doctrine with a doctrine for reviewing agency rulemaking 
that examines the agency’s purpose in regulating and the means used by the agency to 
achieve that purpose—-instead of requiring the agency to use additional procedures and 
scouring the rulemaking record to make up insignificant problems with that record . . . this 
shift would coincide with the modern Court’s insistence that the APA be interpreted as it 
was when Congress enacted it in 1946.”). 
 74 Id. at 455-56 (“The dissent’s position could be described as a more searching stand-
ard of review of the agency’s reasoning process. “The majority did acknowledge “the re-
quirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action,” but the majority’s 
analysis clarified that its idea of “reasoned explanation” required much less than the “rea-
soned decision-making contemplated by the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine.”). 
 75 Id. at 456. 
 76 For example, for a critical view of the new standard for what is deemed to be suffi-
cient for a good reason. See Charles Christopher Davis, The Supreme Court Makes It Hard-
er to Contest Administrative Agency Policy Shifts in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 62 
ADMIN. L. REV. 603, 614 (2010) (“Judicial review in this area is now very deferential; …the 
only thing left for an agency to do is provide good reasons for changing. And these rea-
sons—-it would seem from the opinion—-can be contradictory to experience and unsup-
ported by empirical evidence yet still be acceptable as adequate justification when an agen-
cy turns its back on prior policies.”). 
 77 Mr. McKarcher provides an interesting difference between the adjudication versus 
rulemaking roles of administrative agencies. See Joshua McKarcher, Restoring Reason: 
Reformulating the Swerve Doctrine of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers v. State Farm, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1342, 1370 (2008) (“The essential point is that the standard that Congress set 
in the APA—-and has long left untouched—-is not one requiring “reasoned analysis” but an 
absence of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of discretion under the APA. Words mat-
ter, especially words used by appellate courts. “Reasoned analysis” is certainly appropriate 
when agencies act as judicial bodies to adjudicate cases because the neutrality desired of an 
adjudicator requires them to be free from political influence…. But that hardly means that in 
an administrative policymaking context—-an inescapable political context—-that mere 
“reasons” cannot sufficiently indicate the absence of arbitrary, capricious, or abusive poli-
cymaking.”). 
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example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which 
underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reli-
ance interests that must be taken into account.”78 In other words, the breadth 
dimension of the arbitrary and capricious test is expanded to include the need 
for an agency to provide a reasoned explanation that addresses these relevant 
factors. The specifics of what is expected for the detailed explanation require-
ment will be apparent only when the Fox standard is applied to a particular set 
of circumstances in a case. For instance, the extent to which the new facts need 
to contradict the old facts and what is the threshold level where a reliance in-
terest is deemed “serious” remain unaddressed.79 
Application of the Fox standard to the D. C. Circuit’s review of the Open 
Internet Order. 
It is apparent that in US Telecomm the majority and the dissent (echoing 
many of the views of broadband industry participants and allies) disagree in a 
fundamental way how to apply the lessons of the Fox standard for evaluating 
an agency change in policy in the context of the Open Internet Order. First, 
“US Telecom contends that the Commission lacked good reasons for reclassi-
fying broadband….”80 The specific complaint is expressed along two dimen-
sions discussed above. For one, the Agency fails to include in the breadth anal-
ysis relevant factors and, two, for the relevant factors considered, the depth of 
the analysis lacks appropriate intensity. In short, opponents of the new rules 
argue that the D.C. Circuit’s majority review was too deferential and, thus, did 
not meet the requirements of a reasoned decision-making process called for in 
Fox.81 Second, the dissent maintains that the Agency failed to give reasoned 
attention to the broadband service providers’ claims of disrupted reliance inter-
ests resulting from the reclassification decision and that the factual changes the 
Agency asserted were not real.82 These complaints capture the essence of the 
                                                             
 78 FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
 79 Id. One critic of the Fox standard describes the general “detailed justification” re-
quirement as insufficient to prevent an arbitrary or capricious decision by an agency. See 
Catherine E. Bell, FCC v. Fox: Has the Supreme Court Sanctioned Political Influence in 
Agency Decision-making?, 61 MERCER L. REV. 643, 661 (2010). 
 80 United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 81 Agreeing with this too deferential argument see Jonathan H. Adler, Net neutrality and 
the changing of the guard on the D.C. Circuit—guest post by Daniel Lyons, WASH. POST 
(June 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/06/16/net-neutrality-and-the-changing-of-the-guard-on-the-d-c-circuit-
guest-post-by-daniel-lyons/?utm_term=.3bf03903aee8 (“The majority opinion is dripping 
with agency deference.”). 
 82 See United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 756-60. 
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call by the dissent and critics for the Agency’s decision to be found arbitrary 
and capricious. Four specific complaints are addressed below: the likely nega-
tive effect of reclassification on broadband investment, the failure of the Agen-
cy to discuss the role of market power in the decision-making process, the fail-
ure to address reliance concerns and changed facts, and the lack of economic 
analysis in the Agency’s decision-making process. 
It is clear that the promotion of broadband investment is one of two equally 
prominent objectives of the Telecommunication Act of 1996.83 According to 
the majority, the Open Internet Order is focused on one of these statutory ob-
jectives: the promotion of telecommunications investment and technologies.84 
The Agency provided a theory grounded in economics involving the determi-
nants of broadband investment, to justify the new rules in the form of what is 
called the virtuous cycle.85 It is the prediction of the Agency that the most ef-
fective way to stimulate the quantity of broadband investment is to identify 
factors that increase the demand for broadband investment and, thus, it devel-
oped a broadband policy intended to increase the demand for broadband.86 The 
policy created rules (anti-blocking, anti-throttling, anti-paid-prioritization) to 
facilitate access to broadband consumers by edge providers who create and 
provide the content and applications that broadband consumers desire.87 In the 
view of the Agency, some regulation is necessary to preserve the virtuous cy-
cle.88 On the other hand, the dissent focused on how the new regulation could 
                                                             
 83 The Act is a significant amendment to the Communications Act of 1934. See Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (“An Act [t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in 
order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications 
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”); 
see also 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.  (2012) (“An Act [t]o provide for the regulation of interstate 
and foreign communication by wire or radio, and for other purposes.”). 
 84 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 694. 
 85 The theory is based on a supply and demand model for broadband investment. See id. 
at 694, 707 citing Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining that under the 
Commission’s “virtuous circle” theory, “Internet openness spurs investment and develop-
ment by edge providers, which leads to increased end-user demand for broadband access, 
which leads to increased investment in broadband network infrastructure and technologies, 
which in turns leads to further innovation and development by edge providers.”). 
 86 The non-exhaustive list of factors provided by the Commission to guide the determi-
nation of what constitutes unreasonable interference with, or disadvantaging of includes: 
“end-user or edge-provider access: end-user control; competitive effects; consumer protec-
tion; effect on innovation, investment, or broadband deployment; free expression; applica-
tion agnosticism; and standard practices.” United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 736; 
see Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 16, at 5661-64 ¶¶ 138-145. 
 87 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 707. 
 88 See id. at 733. 
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directly dampen broadband providers’ incentive to invest in broadband infra-
structure.89 In economic terms, regulation could decrease the supply of broad-
band (attributable to supply-side factors such as the costs of regulatory compli-
ance and the uncertainty created by vague rules) which, if considered in isola-
tion, would work against achieving the statute’s objective to increase the quan-
tity of broadband investment.90 The Agency countered this concern by predict-
ing that the positive effects on the demand for broadband investment will out-
weigh the negative effects on the supply of broadband from the new rules, so 
that, on balance, the effect on broadband investment will be positive.91  The 
majority, drawing on case precedent, deferred to the Agency’s expertise with 
respect to its predictive judgments whereas the dissent seemed to engage in 
second guessing.92 The majority’s position is more consistent with the second 
lesson of Fox  that calls for deference when an agency provides an adequate 
rationale for how the new rules will accomplish a legitimate objective of the 
statute.  The majority may not have given the Agency’s analysis a “hard look” 
but the look that it did provide is more consistent with Congress’s intent as 
expressed in the APA.93 
The dissent is concerned with the failure of the Agency and the majority to 
account for the role of market power in the explanation of the new rules.94  The 
basic argument of the dissent is that Title II regulation was originally designed 
for and its subsequent use is dependent on a provider possessing market power, 
                                                             
 89 See id. at 754-56 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 90 Id. at 771, 776 (Williams, J., dissenting). The critics’ prediction of a negative effect 
on the equilibrium quantity of broadband investment is based on a partial equilibrium analy-
sis that ignores the stimulating effects on the demand for broadband from the new rules. See 
also Emma N. Cano, Saving the Internet: Why Regulating Broadband Providers Can Keep 
the Internet Open, 2016 BYU L. REV. 711, 728 (2016). 
 91 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 707. The majority’s prediction, relying on 
the Agency’s economic analysis, allows for the simultaneous influence of multiple factors 
(factors on both the demand-side and supply-side of the market) on the equilibrium quantity 
of broadband investment. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 16, at 
5791 ¶ 410. 
 92 See United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 707, 734, 744-48. It could be that the 
dissent will be vindicated in the future but the majority did not wish to second guess the 
Agency’s predictions, as called for in the Fox decision, to find the new rules arbitrary and 
capricious. 
 93 See id. at 727; 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). An economist, critical of the Open Internet 
Order, calls for, in line with a textbook hard look requirement, more evidence on the likely 
investment effects of a reclassification scheme. See Hal Singer, Court Lets FCC Ignore 
Economics In Net Neutrality Ruling; Congress Must Ensure That It Can’t Ever Again, 
FORBES (June 15, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halsinger/2016/06/15/in-open-
internet-ruling-the-d-c-circuit-defers-to-an-economics-free-agency/. 
 94 See generally United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 770-75 (Williams, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that there is no proffered evidence that consumers have market power). 
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that is, the ability to sustain an increase in price above a competitive level. The 
dissent provides preliminary evidence that broadband service providers do not 
possess market power.95 In addition, the dissent faults the Agency and the ma-
jority for failing to measure the substitutability of wireline and wireless broad-
band.96 In short, to justify the reclassification decision, the dissent argues that 
the Agency needed to make a finding of market power by broadband providers 
and that, if the Agency had bothered to conduct such an analysis, there is suffi-
cient evidence of a robustly competitive access market.97 The majority counters 
that if a service satisfies the requirements to be classified as a telecommunica-
tions service, which they conclude broadband service in fact does satisfy, there 
is no requirement in the definition for a finding of market power.98 Moreover, 
in prior decisions, a finding of market power provided supplemental support 
(and not necessary support) for a recommendation to impose Title II regula-
tion.99 The dissent’s criticism can be conceptualized as a failure of the Agency 
to consider a relevant factor in the analysis. Such a failure can be a reason for a 
finding that the administrative action is arbitrary and capricious. However, the 
Agency and the majority did not believe that examining market power was 
necessary to understand how a broadband service provider acts as a bottleneck 
to a broadband customer and the bottleneck position is what can lead to imped-
iments to unfettered access for end users to Internet content and applications.100 
  
The third lesson of Fox requires an Agency to account for how the new poli-
cy may contradict prior factual findings or engender reliance interests.101 The 
dissent argues that the Agency failed to explain adequately why its prior factu-
al findings are no longer binding and that the Agency ignored the reliance in-
terests of broadband providers created by its prior classification.102 The dissent 
and majority disagree over the magnitude of the impact of the prior infor-
mation services classification on the incentive for broadband providers to in-
                                                             
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 750. 
 97 Id. at 744. 
 98 Id. at 708. 
 99 Id. at 749. 
 100 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F. 3d 623, 647-50 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing the differ-
ence between a finding of market power in broadband markets and the Agency’s theory of 
the gatekeeper relationship between a broadband provider and a broadband customer). 
 101 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F. 3d at 745. 
 102 Id. Both of these concerns are echoed by other critics of the Open Internet Order. See 
generally In re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommuni-
cations Services, WC Docket No. 16-106, Petition for Reconsideration of NCTA – The 
Internet & Television Association (2017). 
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vest in the development of broadband infrastructure. The majority explains that 
it is the position of the Agency that two other economic factors are considera-
bly more significant drivers of broadband investment, the increased demand 
for broadband and increased competition to provide it.103 The regulatory status 
of broadband has an indirect and much smaller effect, as do many other fac-
tors, on investment.104 The dissent mischaracterizes the Agency’s position by 
countering that it is obviously true that many factors influence broadband in-
vestment without recognizing that the majority emphasized the major contribu-
tions of two specific economic factors, neither of which is the regulatory status 
of broadband service.105 
In addition, the majority and dissent disagree on the question whether a ra-
tional business should base a major component of its Internet business plan on 
a regulatory agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous term.106 The dissent de-
scribes a regulatory scenario in which the information services classification 
reflects a “longheld” commitment by the Agency to the information service 
classification decision, one on which it could rationally rely on to make signif-
icant investment decisions.107 The majority describes a different regulatory his-
tory, one in which the Agency had changed its policy with respect to compa-
nies that integrated transmission and information services in the 2002 Cable 
Order and was engaged in a continuous reexamination of the benefits and costs 
of a different policy toward integrated broadband providers.108 In sum, the ma-
jority has the stronger arguments if regulatory status is not a significant driver 
of broadband investment and policy uncertainty resulting from the agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term mitigates reliance interests 
caused by an initial agency interpretation. 
The Agency argues that it has observed changes in factual circumstances as 
broadband technology evolved since its initial interpretation.109 After reviewing 
                                                             
 103 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F. 3d at 710. 
 104 Id. at 709. 
 105 Id. at 710. 
 106 Id. at 731; see generally Nat’l Cable & Telecom Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Serv., 
545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (finding that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous term 
should be subject to continuing reevaluation by the agency and subject to change if circum-
stances so indicate. “An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the 
contrary, the agency…must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on 
a continuing basis, for example, in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change 
in administrations.”). 
 107 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F. 3d at 747. 
 108 Id. at 710. 
 109 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 16, at 5744 ¶330 (The three 
factual changes are “(1) consumer conduct, which shows that subscribers rely heavily on 
third-party services . . . (2) broadband providers’ marketing and pricing strategies, which 
emphasize speed and reliability of transmission . . . and (3) the technical characteristics of 
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the evidence of factual changes, the majority concludes that the Agency “cited 
ample record evidence supporting its current view that consumers perceive a 
standalone offering of transmission.”110 The dissent is not persuaded that there 
have been factual changes in delivery and consumers’ perception of broadband 
services.111 Once again, there is a fundamental disagreement between the ma-
jority and the dissent over how deferential the court should be when it reviews 
the Agency’s factual conclusions.112 In general, the majority favors the Agen-
cy’s views of the facts when it concludes that they are based on expertise and 
are within the discretion of Agency personnel.113 The dissent conducts a more 
intense scrutiny of the Agency’s factual decisions and imposes a more in-depth 
review of the Agency’s reasoning process.114 The approach taken by the ma-
jority is one that is more consistent with the general lessons of Fox.115 
The dissent and other critics are highly critical of the rigor of the economic 
analysis contained in the Open Internet Order.116 One reason for this view is the 
failure of the Agency to give fuller consideration to alternatives to the chosen 
course of action. This criticism is directed at the Agency’s failure to rely only 
on Section 706 authority to develop new rules and the failure to consider op-
tions to the specific rule that imposed a ban on paid prioritization.117 The dis-
sent describes this as a failure to engage in rigorous economic analysis.118 The 
majority was not persuaded by the dissent’s arguments and did not believe 
(correctly) that its role should be to act as economics referees when it engages 
in judicial review of an administrative action.119 The majority believes that the 
                                                                                                                                            
broadband Internet access service.”). 
 110 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F. 3d at 680. 
 111 Id. at 744 (“To the extent that the Commission relied on changed factual circum-
stances, its assertions of change are weak at best and linked to the Commission’s change of 
policy by only the barest of threads.”). 
 112 Id. (Williams, J. dissenting). 
 113 Id. at 706. 
 114 Id. at 744-45 (Williams, J. dissenting). 
 115 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 517-21 (2009).  
 116 See Gus Hurwitz, Economic Analysis in an Age of Deference, AEI (July 19, 2016), 
https://www.aei.org/publication/economic-analysis-in-an-age-of-deference/. 
 117 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F. 3d at 769-70 (Williams, J. dissenting) (provid-
ing extensive criticisms of the paid prioritization rule and presents as supporting evidence 
the views of several economists. This specific rule is the one that the dissent and its allies 
would most like to eliminate or significantly weaken.) 
 118 Id. at 760-61. 
 119 Id. at 697 (“Nor do we inquire whether “some or many economists would disapprove 
of the [agency’s] approach” because “we do not sit as a panel of referees on a professional 
economics journal, but as a panel of generalist judges obliged to defer to a reasonable judg-
ment by an agency acting pursuant to congressional delegated authority.”). The dissent’s 
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Agency articulates an explanation for how the rules are rationally related to the 
statutory purpose.120 
The critics argue that a rigorous economic analysis would require the Agen-
cy to “…do a fuller accounting of the costs and benefits of, and the alternatives 
to, its chosen course of action. In other words, the agency needs not just ex-
plain why its conduct is proper, but also why reasonable alternatives aren’t 
better.”121 This is inconsistent with the first lesson of Fox that concluded that, 
consistent with congressional instructions contained in the APA, there is no 
need for a comparative policy evaluation. The standard only demands that 
there be good reasons for the new policy and that the policy, by itself, is a rea-
sonable choice, meaning that it is consistent with the agency’s statutory author-
ity.122 
 The dissent is applying a scope of review, in both the breadth and depth 
dimensions, that is more expansive and intense than that called for in Fox.123 A 
good description of the underlying complaint captured in the dissent’s opinion 
is provided by a proponent of the Open Internet Order, Public Knowledge Sen-
ior Vice President Harold Feld: “[the] real complaint wasn’t that the commis-
sion failed to conduct an economic analysis, but that the commission’s analysis 
differed from the one that they would have done, that it differed from the one 
that would have yielded their preferred policy outcome.”124  Economic analysis 
should be a part of the Agency’s justification of the chosen policy but it does 
not necessarily require the level of detail the dissent demands.125 
                                                                                                                                            
entire opinion provides a plethora of examples of criticisms that an economics referee would 
make such as why did the Agency fail to consider the implication of another theoretical 
model, the two-sided model, why did the Agency fail to include empirical studies of broad-
band substitution between wireline and wireless, and why did the Agency fail to conduct 
additional empirical studies on the effect of regulatory status on broadband investment. 
These are interesting criticisms but the Agency was not submitting its broadband policy for 
publication in an economics journal.) 
 120 Id. at 710, 714. 
 121 See Hurwitz, supra note 116. 
 122 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 503 (2009). 
 123 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F. 3d at 744-45 (Williams, J. dissenting); see also 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at (2009). 
 124 Hurwitz, supra note 116. 
 125 United States Telecom Ass’n, 825 F. 3d at 744-45 (Williams, J. dissenting). As an 
academic economist, I am well aware of the benefits and limitations of the economic models 
that the critics rely on to make their case. A balanced approach to judicial review should 
account for economics but only in conjunction with the requirements that Congress details 
in congressional statutes. To some extent, the critics want economic analysis to have more 
weight in the agency decision-making process but that position is not consistent with the 
holdings of Fox. Instead, the critics should try to amend through legislative action the APA 
to achieve their desire for a less deferential approach to judicial review of an agency’s poli-
cy choice. 
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PART IV. CONCLUSION. 
Two Court cases focused on in this article, King and Fox, provide diametri-
cally different models for how a court conducts judicial review of administra-
tive action.126 In King, no deference is given to an agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute in defiance of the Chevron doctrine that calls for deference 
in such a case.127 In Fox, an agency’s change in policy is considered reasonable 
as long as it provides merely a rational explanation for how the new policy 
achieves legitimate statutory objectives. In short, the agency only needs to 
make an affirmative case for its chosen policy.128 
The Court seems to be on a path that increasingly questions the basic Chev-
ron assumption that statutory ambiguity is a grant of interpretive power to an 
administrative agency. The Court’s recent action in King reflects a preference 
to retain interpretive power within the judiciary when it decides, based on its 
own perception of the importance of the issue and regardless of the procedures 
the agency used to arrive at its interpretation, to reserve resolution of an ambi-
guity for itself.129 Among the conservative justices on the Court, limiting ad-
ministrative action that qualify for the Chevron framework appears to be part 
of a judicial strategy to provide more checks on the exercise of executive pow-
er.130 The Open Internet Order is an opportunity for the Court to provide more 
specific guidelines for when such a significant transfer of interpretive power is 
in order.131 The proper classification of broadband service arguably could be 
described as a question with large economic and political ramifications. If the 
Court decides to reserve for itself the interpretive question regarding the proper 
classification of broadband service, then there will be no need to apply the Fox 
standard to the Agency’s reclassification decision.132 
                                                             
 126 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483, 2484 (2015); see also Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc., 560 U.S. at 502. 
 127 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 128 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 560 U.S. at 515. 
 129 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483-84. 
 130 Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administra-
tive State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 488-89 (1989) (If Congress chooses to delegate regulato-
ry authority to agencies, part of the price of delegation may be that the court, not the agency, 
must hold the power to say what the statute means. The transfer back of interpretive power 
to the courts is a counterbalancing response to the continuing expansion of the administra-
tive state). 
 131 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 16, at 5732 ¶ 298(For in-
stance, what are the factual assumptions that cause an interpretive question to be one that is 
classified as a “major question.” What are the threshold conditions for when an interpretive 
question passes from an interstitial one to a major one?). 
 132 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 560 U.S. at 514-15. 
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If, however, the Court decides that the question of statutory ambiguity of 
broadband service is appropriate for resolution by the Agency, then the proper 
application of the Fox standard should be highly deferential in the evaluation 
of the reasonableness of the agency’s chosen policy.133 This limited judicial 
role is consistent with the view of an agency as a policymaker with ample dis-
cretion to decide interstitial questions, a role where its expertise and political 
accountability rise to the fore. If the Open Internet Order goes to the Court and 
the Agency’s statutory interpretation is granted Chevron deference, then it is 
highly likely that the reclassification of broadband service will be found to be 
reasonable if the Court follows the model it created in Fox.134 
 
                                                             
 133 Id. at 515-16; see also Lyons, supra note 40, at 2 (The post by Professor Lyons, supra 
note 63, agrees that the two contrasting opinions in US Telecomm reflect this assessment 
that (“…the two opinions may evince a changing of the guard at the D.C. Circuit. Historical-
ly, the court has been unafraid to perform the type of close, critical review of the record that 
Judge Williams undertook…The majority opinion, co-authored by Democratic appointees 
over the dissent of a senior Reagan nominee, suggests that the court may finally be losing its 
appetite for more intrusive judicial review.”). The majority seems to be following the in-
structions of the Fox decision. 
 134 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 560 U.S. at 514-16. 
